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ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW RESEARCH PROGRAM 
The International Law Research Program (ILRP) 
is an integrated multidisciplinary legal research 
program that strives to produce the world’s leading 
international law research on global governance, 
with recognized impact on how international law 
is brought to bear on significant global issues. The 
program connects knowledge, policy and practice 
to build the international law framework and the 
globalized rule of law, and to support international 
governance for the future. One of the core areas that 
the ILRP is focused on is advancing knowledge and 
understanding in international economic law, in 
particular: the governance issues surrounding the 
cross-border resolution of corporate insolvency, 
sovereign debt and global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs). We are interested 
in understanding the role and interests of the 
different international organizations, institutions 
and financial standard-setting bodies and the 
ways in which these institutions can assist in 
designing international law to address these 
challenges. The ILRP is committed to supporting 
the creation of international law to support 
cross-border resolution that is efficient, effective 
and fair. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The International Law Research Program (ILRP) of the 
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) 
welcomes the opportunity to comment on the Financial 
Stability Board’s (FSB’s) Consultative Document, 
“Cross-Border Recognition of Resolution Action” 
(hereafter referred to as the “Consultative Document”) 
that was released on September 29, 2014. 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis highlighted the costs and 
consequences of disorderly resolution procedures for large, 
complex and systemically important financial institutions. 
The appropriate design and implementation of resolution 
procedures for G-SIFIs is critical to limit taxpayers’ 
exposure to the failure of systemically important financial 
firms and to reduce the costs of financial firms’ failure 
for the wider financial system and the real economy. This 
paper’s analysis concludes that a contractual approach 
intended to give effect to resolution proceedings in a 
jurisdiction outside the jurisdiction where the contract 
was issued has a number of limitations that cannot be 
effectively overcome through appropriate contract design. 
A resolution regime based on contractual approaches 
has limited utility because it only binds parties that 
contractually agree to the regime and, even then, may 
have questionable enforceability. A statutory approach 
to a resolution regime should be much more effective in 
achieving financial stability. In designing such a regime, at 
least two goals should be recognized: enabling systemically 
important financial firms to achieve a successful resolution, 
and protecting financial markets whose collapse could be 
systemically risky. The Consultative Document appears 
to focus primarily on the first goal; that focus should be 
broadened to also take into account the second goal. 
To ensure the effective and efficient resolution of financial 
firms it is necessary to establish a regime of uniform 
statutes that provide for enforcement provisions in 
financial contracts. In order to achieve the FSB’s policy 
aims of ensuring the cross-border recognition of resolution 
actions the FSB should establish a Working Group on 
Statutory Mechanisms for the Cross-Border Resolution of 
Financial Firms for the purpose of designing model law for 
national resolution authorities and resolution procedures 
for financial firms. Having regard to the urgency of 
these critical issues this Working Group should seek the 
outside counsel of experts in international insolvency law, 
financial law and bankruptcy law, alongside the expertise 
of prominent members of the judiciary to develop a robust 
model law that would ensure the cross-border recognition 
of resolution actions and that could lead to adoption by 
FSB and non-FSB members. The ILRP would welcome the 
opportunity to contribute to this effort and looks forward 
to continuing our engagement with the FSB on these and 
related matters.
INTRODUCTION
The FSB’s Consultative Document proposes “a package of 
policy measures and guidance” on “how legal certainty 
in cross-border resolution [of troubled financial firms 
and groups] can be further enhanced.”1 That package 
is intended to respond to the FSB’s earlier concern that 
legal “uncertainties about the cross-border effectiveness 
of resolution measures [are] an important impediment to 
cross-border resolution.”2 The package includes statutory 
and contractual approaches to cross-border recognition 
that focus on two particular cases where achieving 
cross-border recognition is said to be a critical prerequisite 
for orderly resolution: temporary restrictions or stays 
on early termination rights in financial contracts; and 
“bail-in” of debt instruments that are governed by the laws 
of a jurisdiction other than that of the issuing entity. 
1  Consultative Document, at iii. The Consultative Document also 
appears to focus at times more narrowly on G-SIFIs. Id. G-SIFIs are a 
subset of cross-border financial firms and groups.
2  Id. (quoting from the FSB’s September 2013 report on “Too Big To 
Fail.”)
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These comments respond to the FSB’s invitation for 
comments on a list of specific questions in the Consultative 
Document. Because those questions largely address 
substantive issues of international insolvency law, the 
authors of these comments include legal experts on 
international insolvency and financial regulation.3 
QUESTION 4
This paper comments first on question no. 4, and thereafter 
on question no. 3, of that list. Question no. 4 asks whether 
contractual approaches can reduce legal uncertainties 
about the cross-border effectiveness of resolution measures: 
4. Do you agree that contractual 
approaches can both fill the gap where 
no statutory recognition framework is in 
place and reinforce the legal certainty and 
predictability of recognition under the 
statutory frameworks once adopted?
Because this is a compound question, the comments on the 
question are divided below into Parts I and II for analytical 
simplicity.
Part I: Do you agree that contractual approaches can 
fill the gap where no statutory recognition framework 
is in place?
Contractual approaches cannot fill the gap, but to a 
limited extent they can help to reinforce legal certainty 
and predictability absent a statutory framework.4 The 
extent to which they are helpful will depend, other things 
being equal, on how widely parties include them in their 
financial contracts. The comments in Part I focus on how 
widely parties are likely to include contractual approaches 
in their contracts. There will be comments in subsequent 
parts5 on whether included contractual approaches are 
likely to be enforceable. 
For financial contracts constituting derivatives, the unique 
dominance of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) over derivatives documentation 
suggests that contractual approaches can help to fill the 
gap. The Consultative Document indicates that ISDA 
is preparing a draft protocol to its Master Agreement — 
intended for adoption by market participants using that 
Agreement to document derivatives transactions — to 
support the cross-border enforcement of a temporary 
3  References in these comments to “insolvency” and “bankruptcy” 
have the meaning of those terms under the relevant law applicable to 
a proceeding for restructuring, liquidating or otherwise addressing the 
liabilities or capital structure of financially troubled firms; and references 
in these comments to “resolution” mean any such proceeding.
4  References in these comments to a statutory framework or approach 
mean one that is nationally multilateral.
5  See infra Parts II and IV.
stay of early termination rights.6 Eighteen of the most 
significant banks globally have since agreed in principle 
to a “Resolution Stay Protocol” under which ISDA 
derivatives contracts would be rewritten to provide for a 
contractually agreed temporary stay (from 24 to 48 hours) 
on termination rights by counterparties of foreign-based 
bank subsidiaries when a subsidiary’s parent is subject to 
resolution within its home jurisdiction. So far, however, the 
Resolution Stay Protocol applies only to these 18 banks, 
and then only for contracts entered into with each other. 
The prospect for more widespread “voluntary” adoption 
is uncertain.7
For other types of financial contracts, contractual 
approaches are much less likely to fill the gap. The 
holdout problem in sovereign debt restructuring provides 
a useful precedent. As a solution to this problem, many 
nations attempted for years to include collective action 
clauses in their financing agreements, thereby enabling 
the supermajority (as opposed to unanimous) voting of 
creditors to change essential payment terms.8 The recent 
Greek debt crisis revealed, however, that 90 percent 
of Greek debt was not governed by those clauses.9 
Moreover, even if all Greek debt contracts had included 
collective action clauses, “such clauses (being contractual) 
would most likely work on an agreement-by-agreement 
basis.”10 That would enable an individual debt issue to 
act as a holdout vis-à-vis other debt issues.11 A statutory 
approach, in contrast, would work across all debt issues.12 
For these reasons, a statutory approach would be “much 
6  Consultative Document, at 12 (which includes discussion on a 
temporary stay as a contractual term). The author has not attempted to 
examine how that contractual approach would harmonize with national 
bankruptcy-law safe harbours.
7  Investment funds and “buy-side firms” generally have expressed 
strong opposition, for example, to incorporating similar contractual 
limitations in view of their perceived fiduciary responsibilities to their 
clients. See Chris Flood, “New Derivative Rules Offer Asset Managers 
Nothing.” Financial Times, October 12, 2014, available at www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/59855dda-4fc2-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de.
8  Steven L. Schwarcz, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An 
Analytical Comparison,” 2 Harvard Business Law Review 95 (2012).
9  Id. at 105.
10  Id. at 106.
11  There currently are attempts by the International Capital Market 
Association and other groups to broaden collective action clauses to work 
across all debt issues.
12  “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options,” supra note 8, at 109.
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more effective[] and predictabl[e]” to solve the holdout 
problem than a contractual approach.13
In what might be viewed as a bootstrap fashion, the 
Consultative Document suggests that contractual 
approaches could be more widely implemented if 
regulators require financial firms already subject to their 
prudential regulatory authority to adopt any necessary 
language in contracts with their counterparties.14 To 
the extent regulators have that authority (and regard its 
exercise, including any associated costs, as politically 
acceptable), this would certainly increase the widespread 
adoption of contractual approaches. Whether regulators 
have that authority not only would vary by the jurisdiction 
and regulated firm but, as explained below, would also 
depend on how its exercise would work. 
The relatively easy case would occur if a bank’s regulators 
require it to include a provision in each of its financial 
contracts, to which the contract’s other parties consent, 
temporarily staying, for example, early termination rights 
under the contract. That case would not bind unregulated 
financial firms, including many firms in the shadow 
banking sector, except to the extent of their specific 
contracts with regulated firms. There is a harder case that 
would cover many more unregulated firms and contracts: 
if the bank’s regulators require it to include a provision 
in each of its financial contracts, to which the contract’s 
other parties consent, that purports to require those other 
parties to include that type of provision in all of their other 
contracts. But that case would appear to be unreasonably 
intrusive and unenforceable. 
Finally, even if parties were to agree to a contractual 
approach that purports to reduce legal uncertainties about 
the cross-border effectiveness of resolution measures, 
the success of that approach would depend not only 
(as mentioned15) on the legal enforceability of the relevant 
contractual provisions but also on the speed and reliability 
in enforcing such provisions. That enforcement may 
depend on such variables as the factual background 
and the intentions and representations of the parties. At 
the least, therefore, a contractual approach would have 
greater litigation risk and less certainty and finality than a 
statutory approach.
13  Id. at 109 (citing, among other sources, Douglas Gale, “Standard 
Securities,” 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 731, 731 (1992) (arguing that investors will 
charge an “uncertainty premium” on unfamiliar securities). A statutory 
approach also “should be more efficient from a market perspective” 
because “[m]arkets do not function efficiently when investors are 
uncertain what will happen.” “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options,” 
supra note 8, at 109. 
14  Consultative Document, at 13.
15  See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Part II: Do you agree that contractual approaches 
can reinforce the legal certainty and predictability 
of recognition under the statutory frameworks once 
adopted?
The answer to this depends critically on the facts. A 
contractual approach to cross-border recognition will 
become largely superfluous once a statutory approach is 
adopted by enough major jurisdictions.16 But a contractual 
approach might help if some parties are from nations that 
have not yet adopted a statutory approach. Contractual 
approaches might then provide some statutory transitional 
certainty and predictability.17 
Such a contractual approach could combine the inclusion 
of a resolution provision recognized by the statutory 
approach with a choice-of-law provision choosing the 
law of a nation that has already enacted that approach. 
Say, for example, that an issuer of debt instruments is 
located in jurisdiction X, which has no laws regarding debt 
bail-in. If those debt instruments are governed by the laws 
of jurisdiction Y, which has a statute recognizing bail-in, 
and if those debt instruments have a contractual bail-in 
provision that is consistent (or, at least, not inconsistent) 
with that statute, the legal certainty and predictability of 
the bail-in would be reinforced.18
On the other hand, a contractual approach would be much 
less likely to reinforce legal certainty or predictability of 
recognition if, instead of binding creditors, it purported 
to bind or impair the rights of an issuer in resolution. For 
example, say that the issuer of debt instruments is located 
in jurisdiction X, which has no laws regarding early 
termination rights in a contract. If those debt instruments 
are contractually governed by the laws of jurisdiction Y, 
which has a statute imposing a temporary stay of early 
termination rights, that jurisdiction-Y statute would 
likely be disregarded in a jurisdiction-X adjudication as 
to whether the issuer, in resolution, could exercise any 
of its contractual termination rights, or as to whether the 
holders of those debt instruments could exercise, adversely 
against the issuer in resolution, any of their contractual 
termination rights. These views reflect the principle that 
an insolvency estate is normally protected under the laws 
of the jurisdiction in which the resolution is taking place. 
16  The comments in this paper do not currently address which 
jurisdictions those would be. Identifying those jurisdictions will ultimately 
be critical. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: 
Why E.T. Can’t Come Home,” 99 Cornell Law Review 1259, 1298 (2014) 
(examining, in the context of derivatives, “what is the minimum number 
of nations that need to agree” to international financial regulation that 
protects against systemic risk in order to “effectively compel the rest of 
the world to conform to their agreed standards”). 
17  That might be especially useful, for example, if a statutory approach 
takes significant time to be widely adopted.
18  Compare infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (raising this 
hypothetical).
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QUESTION 3
This paper will also comment, as indicated, on question no. 
3 of the Consultative Document’s list of specific questions. 
This question asks whether specific resolution actions are 
critical prerequisites for the effective implementation of 
resolution strategies:
3. Do you agree that achieving cross-
border enforceability of (i) temporary 
restrictions or stays on early termination 
rights in financial contracts and (ii) 
“bail-in” of debt instruments that are 
governed by the laws of a jurisdiction 
other than that of the issuing entity is 
a critical prerequisite for the effective 
implementation of resolution strategies 
for global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs)? Is the 
effective cross-border implementation of 
any other resolution actions sufficiently 
relevant for the resolvability of firms 
that the FSB should specifically consider 
ways of achieving their cross-border 
enforceability?
Because this is, again, a compound question, comments on 
it are divided below into Parts III, IV and V for analytical 
simplicity.
Part III: Do you agree that achieving cross-border 
enforceability of temporary restrictions or stays on 
early termination rights in financial contracts is a 
critical prerequisite for the effective implementation 
of resolution strategies for G-SIFIs?
In addressing this question, it is necessary to first 
clarify the meaning of “financial contracts” and “early 
termination rights.” It is assumed in these comments that 
the first phrase includes not merely derivatives contracts, 
but any type of financial contract (including, for example, 
loan agreements). Regarding the latter phrase, although 
the Consultative Document’s use of “early termination 
rights” is often unqualified, suggesting it would include 
a party’s rights to terminate a financial contract with a 
financial firm prior to its stated maturity for any reason, 
the phrase appears to mean termination rights that are tied 
in some way to the financial firm’s resolution. For example, 
footnote 4 and accompanying text of the Consultative 
Document state that such rights “arise only by reason 
of or in connection with a firm’s entry into resolution”19 
and that “[t]his would be broad enough to include early 
termination rights based on the direct default of the 
[financial firm] under resolution, cross default provisions, 
default of a specified reference entity and defaults based 
19  Consultative Document, at 3.
on credit support.”20 The phrase is therefore interpreted 
(and used below) to mean termination rights that are tied 
in some way to the financial firm’s resolution. 
Restrictions and stays on early termination rights in 
financial contracts can be important for the effective 
implementation of resolution strategies. For that reason, 
insolvency laws often restrict the early termination 
of contracts, other than derivatives contracts, that are 
favourable to the debtor.21 The rationale is to better 
enable the debtor to reorganize by keeping advantageous 
contracts in place.22 In contrast, restrictions and stays 
on early termination rights in derivatives contracts that 
hinder the close out netting of those contracts have been 
thought (although not proved) to be systemically risky,23 
with the result that those early termination rights are often 
protected by so-called “safe-harbour” rules.24
This disparate treatment reflects, among other things, two 
different (although not necessarily inconsistent) views 
on how systemic risk can arise. Restricting the early 
termination of contracts that are favourable to a debtor 
enables the debtor, as mentioned, to reorganize.25 From a 
systemic risk perspective, that also helps to assure that a 
firm, including a G-SIFI, can achieve a successful resolution 
(thus reducing counterparty risk — the risk that a G-SIFI’s 
failure becomes systemic by triggering the failure of parties 
to which the G-SIFI contractually owes obligations). On the 
other hand, allowing the early termination of derivatives 
contracts has been thought to help protect markets whose 
collapse could be systemically risky.26 
20  Consultative Document, at 3 n. 4.
21  See, for example, 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (of the US Bankruptcy Code), 
nullifying so-called ipso-facto clauses.
22 Steven L. Schwarcz and Ori Sharon, “The Bankruptcy-Law Safe 
Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis,” 71 Washington 
and Lee Law Review 1715, 1720 (2014) (hereinafter, “Bankruptcy-Law 
Safe Harbor”).
23  Id. at 1742–53. 
24  For comparative overviews of safe harbour rules, see, for 
example, Philipp Paech, “Close-Out Netting, Insolvency Law and 
Conflict of Laws,” Journal of Corporate Law Studies (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414400; Jan De Corte, 
“Enforcement of Close-Out Netting” (May 15, 2014 draft), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2437996.
25  See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
26  “Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor,” supra note 22, at 1724 and 1737; 
Edward J. Janger, Riz Mokal and Robin Phelan, “Discussion Paper: 
Treatment of Financial Contracts in Insolvency — Analysis of the ICR 
Standard” (discussion paper for October 24, 2014 meeting of World Bank 
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force), at 2. See also supra 
notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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In designing an effective resolution system to achieve 
financial stability,27 regulators should try to recognize both 
of these goals: to enable systemically important financial 
firms to achieve a successful resolution, and to protect 
financial markets whose collapse could be systemically 
risky.28 Although the Consultative Document is sometimes 
ambiguous on this point,29 it appears to focus primarily 
on enabling systemically important financial firms, in 
particular G-SIFIs, to achieve a successful resolution.30 That 
focus should be broadened, however, to take into account 
the possibility that early termination rights in financial 
contracts sometimes might be important to protect financial 
markets whose collapse could be systemically risky. 
The initial answer to the question posed in Part III above 
is therefore the following: although achieving cross-border 
enforceability of temporary restrictions or stays on early 
termination rights in financial contracts can facilitate 
the effective implementation of resolution strategies 
for G-SIFIs, it sometimes might undermine the integrity 
of financial markets, with systemic consequences; and 
therefore the desirability of achieving such cross-border 
27  To the extent a resolution regime addresses troubled firms, it 
should also at least take into account the traditional goals associated 
with insolvency and bankruptcy law, including economic efficiency. 
Cf. Douglas G. Baird, “Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms,” 
108 Yale Law Journal 573 (1998) (explaining and distinguishing those 
traditional goals); Eilis Ferran, “European Banking Union: Imperfect, 
But It Can Work,” University of Cambridge Leg. Studs. Research 
Paper No. 30/2014, at 11-12 (April 2014) (distinguishing “resolution” 
from “conventional corporate insolvency regimes,” the former being 
a “specialized process for dealing with distressed banks and, ideally, 
other systemically important financial actors as well”). One thus might 
characterize a resolution regime as focusing on macroprudential-related 
restructuring and a conventional corporate insolvency regime as focusing 
on microprudential-related restructuring. 
28  See, for example, Steven L. Schwarcz, “Systemic Risk,” 97 Georgetown 
Law Journal 193, 202 (2008) (showing that both firm risk and market risk 
contribute to systemic risk). 
29  See, for example, Consultative Document, at 11-12 (stating that 
“Effective stays on termination rights that arise only by reason of or in 
connection with a firm’s entry into resolution are important to prevent 
the close out of financial contracts in significant volumes.”)
30  Janger, Mokal and Phelan, supra note 26, at 7, confirm this focus by the 
FSB: “The Financial Stability Board has published a list of ‘Key Attributes’ 
for resolution of financial institutions. The approach to netting [therein] 
tracks the FDIC regime [which focuses primarily on counterparty risk], 
not the bankruptcy regime” which focuses primarily on market-failure 
risk. 
enforceability should be assessed after case-by-case review 
of the applicable restriction or stay.31 
Assuming arguendo that review of a particular restriction 
or stay indicates that it should have cross-border 
enforceability, this paper also questions whether temporary 
restrictions or stays on early termination rights would 
always be sufficient for the effective implementation of 
resolution strategies for G-SIFIs. The rationale for a merely 
temporary stay appears to reflect a regulatory practice 
to quickly (within two days) transfer a failed bank’s 
performing assets — including the financial contracts — to 
a bridge bank, after which the conditions triggering early 
termination rights of those contracts would no longer 
exist.32 Such a prompt transfer of assets is rare, however, 
outside of the banking context.33 Absent such a prompt 
transfer, one or more financial contracts may be critical to 
a G-SIFI’s successful resolution — such as where a contract 
provides critically needed financing.34 To that extent, any 
otherwise needed restrictions and stays should continue 
longer through the resolution process.35   
31  This case-by-case review should include a balancing of the risks. 
Cf. Janger, Mokal and Phelan, supra note 26, at 4 (observing that 
“protecting the early termination and netting rights of Lehman [Brother]’s 
counterparties may have actually increased counterparty risk, because 
Lehman was unable to honor its other contracts”). Another example of 
a risk might include a firesale of assets. Because the types of assets that 
financial firms own are often correlated to the types of assets held by 
other financial firms, a significant forced sale of assets might trigger a 
market-value decline that (through margin calls and marking to market) 
has self-reinforcing tendencies.
32  Janger, Mokal and Phelan, supra note 26, at 3 and 8.
33  In orderly resolutions, most countries impose a stay of proceedings 
to permit opportunities for resolution to be explored and pursued, and 
allow for the stay to be modified where necessary to balance the best 
interests of all of the parties involved.
34  Incongruously, due to bank lobbying, the US Bankruptcy Code 
restricts early termination rights except for financial contracts that provide 
financing. See 11 U.S.C. 365(c)(2). 
35  Cf. Janger, Mokal and Phelan, supra note 26, at 4 (observing that 
“the early termination of financial contracts proved a serious problem 
in maximizing the value of Lehman [Brother]’s assets”). Although 
beyond the scope of the Consultative Document, this paper also notes 
that a G-SIFI’s successful resolution could be enhanced by restrictions 
and stays on early termination rights in all contracts to which the G-SIFI 
is a party. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Cf. De Corte, supra 
note 24 (questioning the adequacy of the European Union’s resolution 
proposals in view of the very limited nature of the contemplated stay and 
the qualifications on its exercise). 
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Part IV: Do you agree that achieving cross-border 
enforceability of “bail-in” of debt instruments that are 
governed by the laws of a jurisdiction other than that 
of the issuing entity is a critical prerequisite for the 
effective implementation of resolution strategies for 
G-SIFIs?
If, as this question implicitly assumes, the debt bail-in 
is essential to the G-SIFI’s loss-absorbing resources in 
resolution, the answer to this question is trivial: achieving 
cross-border enforceability of “bail-in” of debt instruments 
is a critical prerequisite for the effective implementation of 
resolution strategies for G-SIFIs. That answer would not 
change merely because the debt instruments happen to be 
governed by the laws of a jurisdiction other than that of 
the issuing entity. 
The real import of this question goes to assessing the 
cross-border enforceability of the bail-in of debt 
instruments that are governed by the laws of a jurisdiction 
other than that of the issuer.36 The Consultative Document 
questions this enforceability on the grounds that 
“the write down or conversion [contemplated by the 
bail-in provisions of the debt instruments] might not be 
recognised and enforced by courts outside the issuer’s 
home jurisdiction.”37 Although that enforceability would 
be less likely absent laws that specifically recognize bail-in 
in the countries involved, the bail-in nonetheless should be 
generally enforceable against creditors — subject to the risk 
that courts, citing public policy, might not enforce a bail-in 
that harms local creditors or impairs local financial stability 
or, if a creditor is itself in resolution, that undermines local 
insolvency law policy.38 Some comfort could be obtained 
by requiring legal opinions in the relevant jurisdictions 
confirming such enforceability as a condition to issuance 
of the debt instruments.39 
As a practical matter, it is noted that most debt instruments 
issued to investors internationally are governed either 
by the laws of the issuer’s jurisdiction or by New York 
or English law. If, therefore, the bail-in provisions are 
enforceable under those laws, that would significantly 
help to ensure that such provisions facilitate a G-SIFI’s 
36  This assumes that the laws of the issuer’s jurisdiction respect the bail-
in. If those laws do not contemplate the bail-in, investors may actually 
prefer the debt instruments to be governed by the laws of a foreign 
jurisdiction that respects the bail-in. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying 
text (observing that if the issuer’s jurisdiction has no laws regarding debt 
bail-in, the enforceability of a bail-in would be reinforced by governing 
the debt instruments by the laws of a jurisdiction that recognizes a 
bail-in).
37  Consultative Document, at 4.
38  Cf. Consultative Document, at 14-15 (citing some of these concerns).
39  The Consultative Document recognizes the possibility of requiring 
legal opinions and its inherent limitations. See id.
loss-absorbing resources in resolution. The FSB therefore 
may wish to consider preparing and disseminating model 
bail-in provisions that would be enforceable under those 
laws.
This paper will also make three broader observations about 
bail-in provisions. The Consultative Document states that 
a “key principle” for cross-border bail-in clauses is that 
“the contractual [bail-in] provisions should make it clear 
that the terms of the bail-in will be determined by the 
relevant resolution authority, rather than any conversion 
set out in the debt documentation.”40 To the extent that 
leaves the terms of the bail-in conversion open ended, it 
is unclear how to price, or why an investor would ever 
invest in, those debt instruments. 
Second, the Consultative Document appears to address 
the enforceability, not only of bail-in provisions that the 
parties themselves (for example, the issuer and investors) 
contractually choose, but also of regulatory-imposed 
bail-in provisions. Any regulatory determination whether 
to impose bail-in provisions should take into account the 
possibility of raising the cost of capital or having other 
unforeseen consequences.41
Finally, although question no. 3 does not ask about, 
and the Consultative Document does not address, 
the cross-border enforceability of the bail-in of equity 
securities,42 it sometimes may be important to confirm that 
enforceability.43 The enforceability of an equity bail-in 
would be critical, for example, if it is designed to harmonize 
with a bail-in of debt instruments. Thus, consider a scenario 
in which similar conditions trigger bail-in provisions in an 
issuer’s debt instruments (converting them into common 
equity) and bail-in provisions in the same issuer’s equity 
securities (converting them into a class subordinate to 
common equity). If the latter conversion is not enforceable, 
then, regardless of the governing law, a court may well 
refuse to enforce the debt bail-in because the debtholders 
bargained to have senior, not pari passu (and thus diluted), 
equity positions after the conversion.
40  See Consultative Document, at 14, paragraph 2.2.1(3).
41  For example, automatic conversions of debt claims to equity interests 
might create counterparty risk by reducing the value of firms holding 
those claims.
42  The rationale for this omission would appear to be that the issuer’s 
law always governs equity securities. The comments in this paper do not 
currently purport to address the merits of including bail-in provisions in 
equity securities. 
43  That could be done, for example, through a legal opinion from 
counsel in the issuer’s jurisdiction.
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Part V: Is the effective cross-border implementation 
of any other resolution actions sufficiently relevant 
for the resolvability of firms that the FSB should 
specifically consider ways of achieving their  
cross-border enforceability?
As already mentioned,44 the FSB should consider whether 
restrictions and stays on early termination rights, which 
are otherwise necessary for the effective implementation 
of resolution strategies for G-SIFIs, should continue 
longer through the resolution process (and not be merely 
temporary).
The FSB should also consider whether a stay on the seizure 
of a financial firm’s assets should also be enforceable 
outside of the firm’s jurisdiction. Absent that enforceability, 
creditors of the firm would likely engage in a grab race 
to seize foreign assets, thereby potentially impairing the 
firm’s viability.45
Finally, to the extent some debt instruments issued 
by financial firms do not include contractual bail-in 
provisions and are not subject to a statutory bail-in regime, 
those firms in resolution might need to negotiate changes 
to essential payment terms.46 To accomplish that, those 
firms would need to solve the holdout problem, discussed 
above in the sovereign-debt-restructuring context.47 The 
analysis and (statutory) solution to that problem discussed 
in the sovereign-debt-restructuring context should also be 
applicable to solving that problem in the financial-firm-
resolution context. 
CONCLUSION
A resolution regime based on contractual approaches 
has limited utility because it only binds parties that 
contractually agree to the regime and, even then, may 
have questionable enforceability. A statutory approach 
to a resolution regime should be much more effective in 
achieving financial stability. In designing such a regime, at 
least two goals should be recognized: enabling systemically 
important financial firms to achieve a successful resolution, 
and protecting financial markets whose collapse could be 
systemically risky. The Consultative Document appears 
to focus primarily on the first goal; that focus should be 
broadened to also take into account the second goal. 
44  See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
45  Compare national legislation based on the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency; a list of enacting States is available at www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html.
46 See supra note 8 and accompanying text
47 See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
A statutory approach to a resolution regime could best 
be accomplished by a treaty. Treaties, however, typically 
involve years of negotiation. A more practical alternative 
might be to propose the text of a model law, which could 
be enacted as parallel legislation — thereby becoming the 
functional equivalent of an international treaty entered 
into by the enacting jurisdictions. This type of alternative 
has proved successful in a related context, as evidenced 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
which has been adopted by over 22 countries.48 
48  See supra note 45. UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration has also been adopted by over 60 countries.
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